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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated 
confers appellate jurisdiction upon the Utah Court of Appeals to 
review final judgments of the District Courts of this state in 
matters of this nature, upon referral from the Utah Supreme 
Court. On December 22, 1988 this appeal was poured-over from the 
Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken by the Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions as Receiver for Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company 
("Tracy Collins") from a portion of a final judgment and order of 
the Third Judicial District Court, Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
presiding, granting judgment and setting liability on an 
injunction bond ("Injunction Bond") issued by Tracy Collins as 
surety. See Appendix A. 
After trial, the district court made its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Findings and Conclusions"). R. 
1326-1364. See Appendix B. The district court then entered its 
Judgment on September 26, 1988 ("Judgment"). R. 1370-1377. See 
Appendix C. Tracy Collins filed a motion for a new trial 
pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on 
October 6, 1988. The district court entered its Order Denying 
Tracy Collins1 Motion for New Trial on October 31, 1988. The 
District Court's Order Re: Motion To Set Liability on the Bond 
with Supplemental Findings of Fact was entered on October 31, 
1988 ("Bond Order"). R. 1393-1397. See Appendix D. Tracy 
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Collins filed its Notice of Appeal on November 8, 1988 in which 
it appealed the district court's Judgment, denial of its motion 
for new trial, and the Bond Order, 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented for determination in 
this appeal: 
(1) Was there sufficient evidence to support the 
district court's judgment for damages incurred as a result 
of the wrongful injunction? 
(2) Did the district court err by assessing damages on 
the Bonds for damages not incurred as a result of the 
wrongfully issued injunction? 
(3) Did the district court err by assessing damages on 
the Bonds in the amount the Sharps were undersecured? 
(4) Did the district court err by assessing damages on 
the Bonds in the full amount of the interest incurred on the 
Trust Deed Note? 
(5) Did the district court err by assessing damages on 
the Bonds for attorneys' fees incurred by the Sharps in 
defending against the initial motion for a temporary 
restraining order? 
(6) Did Tracy Collins lack power to act as a surety in 
issuing the Injunction Bond? 
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APPLICABLE RULE 
Rule 65A(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
Security, Except as otherwise provided by law, no 
restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue 
except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in 
such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of 
such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered 
by any party who is found to have been wrongfully 
enjoined or restrained. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings 
and the Disposition Below. 
The district court allowed recovery of interest, 
attorneys1 fees and other damages on an injunction bond issued by 
Tracy Collins. This award represented the amount for which the 
defendants/respondents John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. Sharp 
("Sharps") were undersecured on their Judgment against the 
plaintiffs/appellants Leon H. Saunders, et al. ("Saunders"). 
This action arose when Saunders enjoined the Sharps' 
foreclosure sale and sought specific performance of certain 
obligations under a contract of sale. The Sharps counterclaimed, 
alleging breach of contract by Saunders, claiming entitlement to 
judicial foreclosure of certain property in accordance with the 
trust deed and trust deed note, and asserting that Saunders1 
restraining order, issued on September 4, 1986 by the Honorable 
Judith Billings, was wrongful. The initial Temporary Restraining 
Order ("Initial TRO"), R. 50-51, required a bond in the amount of 
$2,400. In a hearing held in January 1987, Judge J. Dennis 
Frederick continued the injunction and required additional 
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security in the amount of $50,000. Tracy Collins posted the 
$50,000 Injunction Bond on January 11, 1988. (The Initial TRO 
and resulting injunction are hereafter collectively referred to 
as the "Injunctions" and the initial cash bond and Injunction 
Bond are collectively referred to as the "Bonds"). 
During trial on January 28, 1988, January 29, 1988, and 
March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, no evidence was presented 
as to those damages specifically resulting from the issuance of 
the Initial TRO and Injunction. See Trial Transcript, R. 
1642-1650. On September 16, 1988, the Sharps1 Motion to Set 
Liability on the Injunction Bond was heard by the district court. 
On September 26, 1988, the district court entered judgment for 
the Sharps on their counterclaim against Saunders for breach of 
contract. The district court also held that the Initial TRO 
entered on September 4, 1986 was wrongfully issued. The district 
court then awarded the Sharps judgment against the bond posted by 
plaintiffs in the amount of $2,400 and against the security 
posted by Tracy Collins in the amount of $28,570.63, "for which 
amounts the [Sharps] are not secured by the fair market value of 
the subject premises." Judgment, R. 1373. 
On October 31, 1988, the district court entered its 
Bond Order with Supplemental Findings of Fact. The Bond Order 
awarded the Sharps their costs and damages, including attorneys' 
fees, incurred as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction. 
Bond Order, R. 1396. The district court specifically found that 
$5,763.55, representing 4% of the total fees related to the 
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defense of the overall action, was associated with the defense of 
the Injunctions. The district court also found that interest had 
accumulated since September 1986 when the injunction was first 
issued and now far exceeded the combined amount of the Bonds. 
Bond Order, R. 1396-1397. The Judgment against Tracy Collins has 
been stayed pending this appeal. 
2. Statement of Facts. 
The relevant facts in this case are largely undisputed. 
Many can be determined by referring to the District Court's 
Findings and Conclusions, Judgment, and Bond Order. See Appendix 
B, R. 1326-1364; Appendix C, R. 1370-1377; Appendix D, R. 
1393-1397. The remaining facts were established during the 
trial held on January 28, 1988, January 29, 1988 and March 22, 
1988 through March 25, 1988. See Trial Transcripts, R. 
1642-1650. 
1. On September 4, 1986, Saunders filed an action for 
breach of contract and obtained an Initial TRO enjoining the 
Sharps1 trustees1 sale of certain property located in Summit 
County. Saunders posted a cash bond in the amount of $2,400 as a 
condition of the granting of the Initial TRO. Findings and 
Conclusions, R. 1352. 
2. The Sharps counterclaimed, alleging that Saunders 
were in breach of contract and sought judicial foreclosure of the 
property in accordance with the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note 
and dissolution of the Initial TRO issued on September 4, 1986. 
Findings and Conclusions, R. 1354. 
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3. In January of 1987, Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
continued the injunction and ordered an Injunction Bond in the 
additional amount of $50,000. Tracy Collins as surety posted 
this Injunction Bond on behalf of Saunders on January 11, 1988. 
Findings and Conclusions, R. 1352; Bond Order, R. 1395. 
4. At trial, Mr. LeRoy J. Pia, the appraiser whose 
valuations were used in determining value of the property, 
testified that at the January 1987 bond hearing it was agreed 
that the land would only be worth approximately $17,500 per acre 
as a lower limit of value (without sewer and water), and that an 
upper limit of value (without sewer and water) would be 
approximately $20,000 per acre. Trial Transcript, R. 1644 at 
493-494. 
5. Following trial, the district court found that the 
present fair market value of the property with one sewer and 
water connection was $20,000 per acre. Bond Order, R. 1394. 
6. Following trial, the district court found that the 
present fair market value of all of the property upon which the 
Sharps may foreclose pursuant to the Judgment is $728,445.00. 
Bond Order, R. 1394. 
7. Under the Judgment, the district court found 
various of the Saunders plaintiffs jointly and severally indebted 
to the Sharps in the total amount of $759,415.63. Bond Order, R. 
1395. 
8. The district court found that the Initial TRO was 
wrongfully issued, Bond Order, R. 1396, and that the Sharps were 
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entitled to recover on the Bonds the difference between the 
damages which the court found the Sharps have suffered as a 
result of Saunders' breaches of contract ($759,415.63) and the 
appraised value of the collateral ($728,445.00). Accordingly, 
the Sharps are undersecured by the amount of $30,970.63. Bond 
Order, R. 1394-1395. 
9. The judgment on the Bonds in the amount of 
$30,970.63 was for the Sharps1 "interest, attorneys1 fees, and 
other damages incurred as a result of the issuance of the 
wrongful Temporary Restraining Order . . . ." Findings and 
Conclusions, R. 1363; Bond Order, R. 1396. 
10. The district court found that $5,763.55 of the 
Sharps1 attorneys1 fees was incurred in defending against the 
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. Bond Order, R. 1396. 
This amount was based upon Sharps1 counsel's estimate that at 
least four percent (4%) of the Sharps' total fees related to the 
defense of the breach of contract action was specifically related 
to the defense of the Initial TRO. Id. 
11. The district court found that interest on the 
principal due under the Trust Deed Note for the period of July 1, 
1986 through March 22, 1988 equalled $115,677.12. Bond Order, R. 
1395. 
12. The district court awarded the Sharps judgment on 
the cash bond in the amount of $2,400.00, and "against the 
security posted by Tracy Collins Bank with the Clerk of the Third 
Judicial District Court in the amount of $28,570.63, for which 
-7-
amounts the Sharps are not secured by the fair market value of 
the subject premises.11 Judgment, R. 1373. 
13. The district court additionally found that the 
amount of interest alone which has accumulated since September 
1986, when the Injunction was first issued, far exceeds the 
amount of the Bonds. Bond Order, R. 1396-1397. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court incorrectly allowed recovery on the 
Bonds for damages caused independently of the Injunctions. Only 
those damages that were incurred "as a result of the wrongfully 
issued injunctions" are recoverable on the Bonds. The 
Injunctions were merely ancillary to the main action for breach 
of contract. The damages sought to be recovered against the 
Bonds are all recoverable against the Saunders in the main 
action. 
Damages arising from Saunders1 breach of contract 
cannot be assessed against the Bonds. The correct measure of 
damage as a result of an injunction is the difference between the 
fair market value of the property on the date the injunction 
prevented its sale and the fair market value on the date the 
injunction was lifted. 
The district court held that the fair market value of 
the property on the date of judgment, which is the date the 
Injunctions were dissolved, was $20,000 per acre. Bond Order, R. 
1394. See property valuation summary, Appendix E. The closest 
valuation to the September 4, 1986 Temporary Restraining Order 
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was January 1987, at the hearing where the increased Injunction 
Bond was ordered. In January 1987, the fair market value was 
$17,500 — $20,000 per acre. Trial Transcript, R. 1644 at 
493-494. Therefore, the Injunctions resulted in no decrease in 
the fair market value of the property. 
The district court erred in awarding attorneys1 fees 
for resisting the Initial TRO as damages on the Bonds. Only 
attorney's fees expended in dissolving an injunction are 
recoverable. Thus, the specific award of attorneys1 fees in the 
amount of $5,762.55 must be reduced by the amount of fees 
incurred in defending against the Initial TRO and the district 
court should be directed to determine the amount of attorneys' 
fees, if any, associated with efforts expended to dissolve the 
Injunctions. However, this Court may find that the Injunctions 
were so ancillary to the main breach of contract action that no 
damages for attorneys1 fees are recoverable on the Bonds. 
Appellant asserts for the first time that Tracy Collins 
lacked the power to act as a surety and that its actions in 
issuing the Injunction Bond are ultra vires and void. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ONLY DAMAGES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE WRONGFULLY 
ISSUED INJUNCTIONS ARE RECOVERABLE. 
Under Rule 65A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the terms of Tracy Collins1 Injunction Bond, Appendix A, the 
Sharps are only entitled to recover "costs [or] damages incurred 
as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction." Mountain 
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States Tel, & Tel, Co, v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 
P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1984). Recoverable damages under an 
injunction bond are limited to those that "arise from the 
operation of the injunction itself and not from damages 
occasioned by the suit independently of the injunction." Beard 
v. Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Lever 
Bros. Co. v. International Chem. Workers Union, 554 F.2d 115, 120 
(4th Cir. 1976)). The district court failed to adhere to these 
requirements when it awarded the Sharps damages for the amount 
the principal judgment was undersecured. This measure of damages 
is based on the suit independently of the Injunctions and was 
incorrect. 
Although Tracy Collins may have been a surety for all 
damages caused as a result of the Injunctions, it did not assume 
liability as a guarantor for the Sharps' damages flowing from 
Saunders1 breach of contract. The Sharps1 damages resulting from 
the underlying suit for breach of contract are not recoverable 
from the Bonds.- Carr v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co.y 228 Va. 
644, 325 S.E. 2d 86, 89-90 (1985). 
In its Supplemental Findings of Fact, the district court 
found that the Sharps1 damages for breach of the Trust Deed 
and Trust Deed Note were $759,415.63. Bond Order, R. 1395. 
This amount included all attorneys' fees in defending the 
action and in prosecuting their claims against the Saunders, 
plus interest under the Trust Deed Note. Id. In addition, 
the district court found that the present fair market value 
of the property was $728,445.00. Bond Order, R. 1394. 
Accordingly, the Sharps1 judgment against the Saunders for 
breach of contract was undersecured by the amount of 
$30,970.63. Id., R. 1395. This amount was awarded against 
the Bonds. Id. 
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The proper measure of damages is the reduction or 
diminution in the value of the security during the period of 
restraint. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. First Natfl Bank of Nev., 83 
Nev. 196, 427 P.2d 1, 4 (1967). The Glens Falls court stated 
that: 
If the property was not sold, we fail to see where 
respondent suffered any damages because its accruing 
interest at the contract rate, and the cost of preserving 
and maintaining the property and expenses of the default 
proceedings may still be recovered either upon the default 
being cured by payment or ultimately upon the trustee's 
sale. 
Id. at 4. 
In Carr v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co., 325 S.E. 2d at 
90, where the sale of property was stopped by a wrongfully issued 
injunction, the court stated that: 
[t]he proper measure of a decrease in market value of 
property caused by delay resulting from wrongful issuance of 
an injunction is the difference in market value at the time 
it would have been sold absent any restraint and the market 
value when the injunction no longer prevented the sale. 
JEd. S^ e Global Contact Lens, Inc. v. Knight, 254 So. 2d 807, 809 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) cert, denied, 260 So.2d 520 (1972) 
(proper measure of damages is the fair market value of the 
premises at the time the wrongful restraint was imposed compared 
with the value of the property the day the injunction was 
dissolved). 
The Sharps failed to meet their burden of proving both 
the amount and the cause of damages. It is especially important 
for the court to evaluate the source of the Sharps1 damages since 
the Injunctions were only ancillary to the principal relief 
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sought. Id. 
Following trial, the district court found that the 
present fair market value of the property was $20,000 per acre. 
Bond Order, R. 1394; Appendix E. At trial, Mr. LeRoy J. Pia, the 
appraiser whose valuations were used to determine present fair 
market value, testified that at the January 1987 bond hearing the 
property was worth approximately $17,500 per acre as a lower 
. . 2/ 
limit of value with an upper limit around $20,000 per acre.-
Trial Transcript, R. 1644 at 493-494. Thus, on the date the 
Injunctions were dissolved, the fair market value of the property 
was approximately the same as the fair market value of the 
property on the date of restraint. 
From the only evidence in the record, the delay caused 
by the wrongful Injunctions resulted in no decrease in the market 
3/ 
value of the property. Consequently, no damages- are 
recoverable on the Bonds as no damages were "incurred as a result 
of the wrongfully issued injunction." Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. Co. v. Atkinr Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d at 1262. 
See Beard v. Duqdale, 741 P.2d at 969; Carr v. Citizens Bank and 
Trust Co., 325 S.E. 2d at 90; Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l 
Bank of Nev., 427 P.2d at 4. 
No evidence was introduced as to the fair market value of 
the property with one sewer and water connection on 
September 4, 1986. The closest appraisal to the date of the 
Initial TRO is the January 1987 appraisal. 
However, damages for attorneys1 fees expended in dissolving 
an injunction may be recoverable, as is more fully discussed 
in Point III, infra. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CONTRACT INTEREST 
AS RECOVERABLE DAMAGE ON THE BONDS. 
The district court found that the interest accumulated 
since September 1986, when the Injunctions were first issued, far 
exceeds the amount of the Bonds. Bond Order, R. 1396-1397. Not 
only does this approach obscure the true source of the Sharps1 
damages, but it is based on the mistaken belief that interest on 
a Trust Deed Note is properly assessed against an injunction bond 
when the sale of property is delayed. 
The proper approach is to distinguish damages, such as 
interest on the Trust Deed Note, which are recoverable in the 
main contract action, from damages incurred as a result of the 
wrongfully issued injunction. In Glens Fallsr the Nevada Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court's award of interest damages on an 
injunction bond and stated, as follows: 
Appellant, as surety under the restraining order bond, was 
no party to that contract, nor did its assurance run to the 
performance of the contract. Furthermore, when the property 
is ultimately sold under the trust deed or the default 
cured, the beneficiary would receive in either event its 
interest at the contract rate. Thus if the measure of 
damages was interest, either at the contract or legal rate, 
beneficiary would enjoy double recovery. [The surety's] 
undertaking against loss, in the event the restraint was 
improper, was only to "damages and costs" sustained or 
incurred by reason of the restraining order. 
427 P.2d at 4. 
The damages assessed against the Bonds include contract 
interest that was also awarded on the Judgment. Facts and 
Conclusions, R. 1343, 1361-1362; Appendix E. Nowhere did the 
district court find that the interest "directly" or "proximately" 
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arose out of the wrongful issuance of the Injunctions. These 
damages must be separated from those occasioned by the underlying 
suit. Beard v. Duqdale, 741 P.2d at 969 (citations omitted). 
The district court supposedly avoided the "double 
recovery" concern of the Glens Falls court by only awarding 
interest damages up to the amount the Judgment was undersecured. 
This interpretation of Glens Falls not only ignores the holding 
of the Nevada Supreme Court that the proper measure of damages 
would be the reduction or diminution in the value of the security 
during the period of restraint, but also ignores the extent of 
Tracy Collins' undertaking. Tracy Collins was a surety only for 
those damages caused as a result of the wrongful injunction, not 
a guarantor of the Saunders1 performance under their contract 
with the Sharps. Furthermore, since the property has not been 
sold, the Sharps could receive a "double recovery" if the 
property sells for more than the present fair market valuation. 
The Sharps may argue that this is a remote possibility, but it 
nevertheless illustrates what the Glens Falls court was 
attempting to avoid. The Sharps have their remedy for accrued 
interest against the Saunders and this Court should not hold the 
surety liable for a contract undertaking that Tracy Collins did 
not assume. 
There is no controlling Utah precedent addressing the 
recoverability of interest. However, Utah cases addressing Rule 
65A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure support the denial of 
the recovery of interest on the Trust Deed Note as damages on the 
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Bonds. Cf. Beard v. Dugdale, 741 P.2d at 969;cMountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co, v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d at 
1262. Just as the Supreme Court of Nevada denied interest as an 
appropriate measure of damages in Glens Falls, this Court should 
also reverse the district court's award of interest on the Bonds. 
Such a ruling would not deny the Sharps1 recovery 
because they retain a judgment for the same interest against the 
Saunders for breach of contract. It merely separates damages 
arising from the Injunctions from those awarded against the 
breach of contract action and gives proper effect to Rule 65A(c) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING THE RECOVERABLE 
AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES ON THE BONDS. 
The District Court found that $5,762.55 of the Sharps1 
attorneys1 fees were incurred in defending against the Motion for 
a Temporary Restraining Order. This amount was based solely on 
the estimate of opposing counsel that approximately four percent 
(4%) of the Sharps1 total attorneys1 fees related to the breach 
of contract action were specifically related to the defense of 
the Initial TRO. Bond Order, R. 1396. It is undisputed that 
certain types of attorneys1 fees are recoverable on an injunction 
bond in Utah. See Beard v. Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968. However, such 
attorneys1 fees are limited only to the hours spent by the 
Sharps1 counsel as a result of the wrongfully issued Injunctions. 
Id. at 969. The District Court erred in not requiring a specific 
showing of attorneys1 fees expended "as a result" of the 
-15-
Injunctions and further erred in including in the award of 
attorneys' fees an amount for time expended in resisting the 
issuance of the Initial TRO. 
Recoverable damages on an injunction bond include 
reasonable attorneys'- fees rendered in proceedings directed at 
removing an injunction. State ex rel. County of Shannon v. 
Chilton, 626 S.W. 2d 426, 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). However, fees 
incurred in resisting the initial issuance of an injunction are 
not recoverable. Wolverton v. Holcomb, 329 S.E. 2d 885, 889 (W. 
Va. 1985). It was error for the district court to include in its 
award of attorney's fees an amount for resisting the Initial TRO. 
Braun v. Intercontinental Bank, 452 So.2d 998, 999 (Fla. App. 
1984) (attorneys' fees awarded must be restricted to services 
rendered in undoing a wrongful injunction). 
In the case at bar, the Sharps did not attempt to have 
the Injunctions dissolved. Instead, the Sharps proceeded to 
judgment against Saunders on their contract claims. The focus of 
the district court was not the Injunctions, but the Sharps' right 
to relief in the principal case. Thus, the Injunctions were only 
an ancillary matter. See, e.g., Wolverton v. Holcomb, 329 S.E. 
2d at 886-87; Global Contact Lens, Inc. v. Knight, 254 So.2d at 
810. "[I]t is incumbent on the plaintiff to show either that 
injunction was the sole relief to which the suit pertained, or 
that the fees and expenses were paid out solely for the purpose 
of procuring a dissolution of the injunction, as distinguished 
from expenditures for the hearing of the principal issues 
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involved in the case." Wolverton v. Holcomb, 329 S.E. 2d at 889 
(quoted citation omitted). The failure of the district court to 
segregate those services performed in dissolving the injunction 
is reversible error. Global Contact Lens, Inc. v. Knight, 254 
So. 2d at 810. 
Ordinarily, a case of this nature should be remanded to 
the district court with the direction to obtain specific evidence 
as to the amount of attorneys' fees expended, if any, in seeking 
the dissolution of the Initial TRO and the resulting Injunction. 
However, since no motion attempting to dissolve the injunction 
was filed, this Court can conclude that the issuance of the 
Injunctions relative to the whole action was so ancillary as to 
result in a de minimus award of attorneys1 fees. Absent a 
specific and segregated accounting, the Sharps should take 
nothing on the Bonds for their attorneys' fees. 
IV. TRACY COLLINS LACKED THE POWER TO ACT AS SURETY ON THE 
INJUNCTION BOND, 
Surety/Appellant submits that Tracy Collins lacked 
power to issue the Injunction Bond and thus its issuance is an 
ultra vires act and void. Counsel for Tracy Collins 
understandably failed to raise this issue below because to do so 
could have exposed Tracy Collins and its officers and directors 
to possible liability. In director and officer liability suits 
the courts have created the doctrine of adverse domination which 
recognizes that a party cannot be expected to bring suit against 
himself. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp, v. Hudson, 673 F. Supp. 
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1039, 1043 (D. Kan. 1987); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Carlson, 
698 F. Supp. 178, 180 (D. Minn. 1988) (doctrine of adverse 
domination tolls statute of limitations as long as the parties 
against whom the claims are brought controlled the bank). The 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions as Receiver has stepped 
into the shoes of Tracy Collins and as a non-control party should 
now be entitled to raise this issue for the first time. 
Under Utah law, a banking corporation's general powers 
are limited. It is an established principle of banking law that 
a bank does not have the power to act as a surety or guarantor. 
See Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Jefferson Trust Co.f 14 N.J. Misc. 
656, 186 A. 732, 734 (N.J. 1936) (both an accommodation guaranty 
made for the benefit of another and an indemnity agreement were 
outside the corporate powers and were, therefore, void as ultra 
vires acts). A national "bank has no power to act as a guarantor 
or surety upon the obligation of another." American Empire Ins. 
Co. v. Hanover Nat'l Bank of Wilkes-Barre, 409 F. Supp. 459, 463 
(M.D. Penn. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 564 (3rd Cir. 1977). See Utah 
Code Annotated, S 7-3-17 (the business of banking includes "all 
powers and authority that a national bank having its principal 
office in this state possesses"). By analogy, Tracy Collins, as 
a state chartered member bank of the Federal Reserve System, 
should also be restricted from acting as a guarantor or surety. 
Sabin Meyer Regional Sales Corp. v. Citizens Bank, 502 F. Supp. 
557, 559 (N.D. Ga. 1980) suggests that the FDIC regulations 
prohibiting member banks from executing contracts of guaranty or 
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surety under 12 C.F.R. section 332.1 also apply to nonmember 
banks. 
Even though this issue was not raised below, the 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, now Appellant herein, 
urges this Court to consider sua sponte whether Tracy Collins1 
issuance of its Injunction Bond is a prohibited ultra vires act, 
which is void from its inception. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court misapplied the law and Tracy 
Collins1 statutory and contractual undertaking to assure the 
payment of only those damages incurred as a result of the 
wrongfully issued Injunctions. Such damages do not include 
attorneys1 fees incurred in defending against the Initial TRO and 
they do not include contract damages such as interest. The 
evidence before the district court demonstrated that the fair 
market value of the property was approximately the same on the 
date of restraint and date of judgment. In light of this 
evidence, the district court committed error in awarding interest 
damages on the Bonds. The judgment of the district court should 
be reversed and remanded for the taking of evidence on the 
limited issue of the amount of attorneys1 fees that resulted from 
the Sharps' efforts to dissolve the Initial TRO and resulting 
injunction. 
However, this Court may simply reverse the district 
court's Judgment by concluding that the Injunctions were so 
ancillarv to the main action that not even damages for attorneys' 
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fees are recoverable on the Bonds. Finally, this Court should 
rule sua sponte that Tracy Collins lacked the power to issue the 
Injunction Bond and, therefore, that the Injunction Bond is void. 
DATED this /f—day of 
:anford B. Owen 
Patrick L. Anderson 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions as Receiver for 
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust 
Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
,is JT-This is to certify that on th / I day of July, 1989, I 
caused to be mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Surety/Appellant, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. 
Glen D. Watkins, Esq. 
Mark R. Gaylord, Esq. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Saunders, Felton and White Pine 
Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Donald J. Winder, Esq. 
Kathy A.F. Davis, Esq. 
Tamara K. Prince, Pro hac vice 
WINDER & HASLAM 
Attorneys for John and Geraldine Sharp 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Glen D. Watkins, Esq. (#3397) 
Mark R. Gayiord, Esq. (#5073) 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Sixth. Floor, Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (301) 532-7520 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND POR.SALT LAEE COUNTT 
STATS OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT 
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
COR?., a Utah corporation; 
WHITE PINE RANCHES, a Utah-
general partnership? and 
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a 
Utah general partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN C. SHARP, GERALDINE Y. 
SHARP, and ASSOCIATED TITLE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
as Trustee, 
Defendants. 
Case No. C87-1621 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
SNOW ALL MSN BY THESE PRESENTS, that White Pine Ranches, a 
Utah partnership, White Pine Enterprises, a Utah partnership, Leon H. Saunders, 
Saunders Land Investment Corporation, a Utah corporation, Robert Feiton, J. 
Richard Rees (collectively "Plaintiffs"), as principals, and Tracy Collins Bank <Jc 
Trust Company ("Tracy"), a Utah banking corporation as surety ("Surety"), are held 
and firmly bound unto John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. Sharp, defendants in the 
above-entitled action, in the sua of Fifty Thousand-Dollars' (SSff.ffTO). 
APPENDIX A 
WHEREAS, the defendants have been temporarily restrained by a 
temporary restraining order, dated September 4> 1S8S which remains in effect 
pursuant to the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick's order of January 4, 1988 (the 
"Order"). 
WHEREFORE, the conditions of the Bond are that (1) if the court 
adjudges and declares that the Sharps have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained 
by the Order, then Surety shall pay in full the cost and damages as the court shall 
determine in accordance with Rule 65(c), Utah R. Civ. P., that the Sharps have 
incurred or suffered as a result of being wrongfully enjoined or restrained* 
provided* as to the Surety, such, costs and damages, shall nat exceed the, amougfcaf 
the Bond; and CD if tire court adjudges and decteajtafcJtteSar^ 
wrongfully enjoined or restrained by the Order, then this Bond is void. 
^ In connection with this Bond* Tracyr as Surety, submits itself to the 
jurisdiction of this court and irrevocably appoints the cierk of this court as an 
agent upon whom any papers affecting its liability on the Bond may be served, and 
further agrees that its liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity 
of an independent action. 
DATED this / / ^ day of January, 1938. 
WHITE PINE RANCHES, a Utah 
partnership 
By. 
Its, 
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a Utah 
partnership 
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<wik H. Sa LecTHT unders, an indi 
Robert Feiton, an individual 
JTRicnard Rees, an individual 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation 
'JA^fau/. 
Its fJK*r>,,7j>J7-
TRACY COLLINS BANK & TRUST CO., a 
Utah corporation 
its /£±~y~^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Oa this lltfr day of January, 1988, I hereby certify that I caused to be 
mailed via United States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and accurate 
copy of the foregoing BOND, to the following: 
Donald J. Winder, Esq. 
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq. 
WINDER & KASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
John B. Anderson, Esq. 
623 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Robert Feltorw Esq* 
310 South Main Street, Suite 130S 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and that the original Eond was delivered to the Clerk of the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, prior to 5:00 o'clock p.m. on the 
aforesaid date as required by the Order of January 4, 1988, of the Eonorable 
J. Dennis Frederick, Third District Judge. 
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Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3519) 
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq. (#4022) 
Tamara K. Prince, Esq. (#5224) 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharps 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT 
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general partnership; 
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a 
Utah general partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE 
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP, 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT FELTON; LEON H. 
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; KENNETH R. NORTON dba 
INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC., 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C87-1621 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
APPENDIX B 
and PAUL H. LANDES, indivi-
dually; WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
This cause came on for trial before the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick on January. 28, 1988 through January 29, 
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the de-
fendants John C. and Geraldine Y. Sharp (hereinafter the 
MSharpsM) appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A. F. 
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac 
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enter-
prises, Leon H. Saunders (hereinafter "Saunders"), Robert 
Felton (hereinafter HFeltonH), J* Richard Rees and Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation appearing by counsel Robert M. 
Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord. Counterclaim 
defendant Kenneth R. Norton ("Norton") appeared through his 
counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and 
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim 
defendant Norton. Defendant Associated Title was never served 
in this action. Counterclaim defendant Paul H. Landes (here-
inafter "Landes") was never served in this action. 
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, hav-
ing reviewed and received exhibits, having heard the arguments 
of counsel, having received stipulations of counsel, having 
reviewed memoranda presented by counsel, having presented its 
oral ruling on the issues involved in the case on March 30, 
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1988, having heard and ruled upon the plaintiffs' objections 
to defendants' proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Plaintiffs' Proposed Alternate and Additional Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on September 16, 1988, and for 
good cause appearing, hereby makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about December 9, 1980, Leon H. Saunders, 
Robert Felton, Norton and Paul H. Landes entered into an Ear-
nest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (hereinafter "Earnest 
Money") with the Sharps for the purchase of certain real prop-
erty located in White Pine Canyon, Snyderville, Summit County, 
State of Utah (hereinafter "the Subject Property"). (Exhibit 
14). 
2. Plaintiffs' "development plans presently anticipated 
12 to 15 four-acre to five-acre lots" and the Earnest Money 
provided "such plans shall be subject to the reasonable 
approval of Seller [the Sharps]." 
3. The Earnest Money also provided, inter alia: 
At a time desired by Seller, Purchaser 
shall allow Seller to hook into the 
culinary water system and sewer system 
developed by Purchaser on the subject 
Property at the same per-hook-up price 
charged by Purchaser to the buyers of 
lots developed on the subject Property. 
4. The plaintiffs acted upon the understanding that be-
fore Summit County would approve any planned development, 
they, as the developer, must provide to Summit County for 
approval an environmental impact statement, a plat map and, if 
a planned residential development, a declaration of protective 
-3-
covenants. The Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District 
("SBSID") required all sewer design improvements be approved 
and construction must receive final approval. 
5. Plaintiffs wanted to promptly develop the Subject 
Property and anticipated the approval process would be com-
pleted by June, 1981. 
6. Prior to closing the .transaction which was the sub-
ject of the Earnest Money, a Shared Water System Cost Estimate 
was prepared for Saunders by J. J. Johnson & Associates, engi-
neers in Park City. The Estimate proposed two alternatives 
wherein 15 units at Saunders Ranch (subsequently White Pine 
Ranches), known herein as the "Subject Property", develop a 
water system sufficient for its needs and the needs of various 
adjacent properties in order to provide users of the water 
system an economy of scale resulting in lower water system 
costs to each user. (Exhibit 105). Although considered by 
him, Saunders never adopted any of these proposals. 
7. In April, 1981, an Environmental Impact Statement 
(hereinafter "EIS") was prepared by J. J. Johnson for Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation concerning development of the Sub-
ject Property and was delivered to the Sharps prior to clos-
ing. (Exhibit 67). 
8. The EIS provided the "sewer system will be connected 
to the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District and a line 
extension agreement with the Sewer Improvement District will 
be signed." The EIS also provided two alternative water stor-
age systems for the development on the Subject Property which 
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would be available to other proposed developments, including 
Ranch Place and Landmark Plaza, as well. The EIS further pro-
vided that the internal traffic circulation in the subject 
project would be via private road. 
9. In April 1981, Felton, Norton, Saunders and Landes 
operated under the assumed name of White Pine Ranches. 
(Plaintiffs' Complaint, 551 and. 5). 
10. Thereafter, on or about July 16, 1981, the parties 
closed the sale of the Subject Property through the execution 
of a Memorandum of Closing Terms (Exhibit 15) executed by 
Saunders, Felton, Norton, Landes and the Sharps; a Special 
Warranty Deed (Exhibit 17) executed by the Sharps and convey-
ing the title to the Subject Property to Landes, Felton, 
Saunders and Interstate Rentals, Inc.; a Trust Deed Note ex-
ecuted by Felton, Saunders, Landes, Norton and Interstate 
Rentals, Inc. by its president, Norton, in the amount of 
$963,055.30, together with an addendum to the Trust Deed Note 
(Exhibit 3) outlining the schedule of payments, and a Trust 
Deed covering the Subject Property executed by Saunders, 
Landes, Felton and Interstate Rentals, Inc. by its president, 
Norton, and securing the Trust Deed Note (Exhibit 2) (herein-
after collectively referred to as "the Closing Documents"). 
11* A partnership agreement establishing White Pine 
Ranches was executed September 25, 1982 with Felton, Saunders, 
Dan Hunter and J. Richard Rees as general partners. (Exhibit 
49). Saunders Land Investment Corporation subsequently as-
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sumed and bought out the interest of Dan Hunter in the White 
Pine Ranches partnership. 
12. On June 30, 1982 White Pine Ranches and Howells In-
vestment executed a Partnership Agreement of White Pine Enter-
prises for the purposes of "investing in, managing, leasing, 
developing, subdividing and selling unimproved real estate 
(Exhibit 48) described on Exhibit 'A1 attached" thereto, which 
unimproved real estate was the approximately 27 southern acres 
of the Subject Property that was never platted. 
13. Both partnerships, White Pine Ranches and White Pine 
Enterprises, are general partnerships. 
14. Preliminary plats (Exhibits 18 and 19) of the Sub-
ject Property were prepared by J. J. Johnson & Associates for 
the development prior to closing, but were modified by plain-
tiffs because the County Commission was opposed to the private 
road concept. (Exhibit 109). These preliminary plats were 
not approved prior to closing because the County Attorney 
would not approve a private road system (Exhibit 114). A new 
plat was prepared for White Pine Ranches, a Planned Unit De-
velopment ("PUD-) and attached as Exhibit "A" to the Memo-
randum of Closing Terms. This Exhibit "A" to the Memorandum 
\ z of Closing Terms platted all of the Subject Property and was 
J 90 
> 2 initialed by all the parties thereto except Felton. (Exhibit 
20). 
iS||2g 15. Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms (Ex-
hibit 15) provided as follows: 
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1. It is mutually agreed and 
understood that after recordation of 
the PUD Plat and the Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, 
and upon receipt of each $140,000.00 in 
principal (but not including the 
earnest money and down payment money), 
Seller shall execute and deliver to 
Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance 
for one (1) PUD lot. (Emphasis added.) 
16. Paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
/ided as follows: 
2. Upon the payment of the 
release price, Buyer shall be entitled 
to the release of one (1) lot of Buy-
er's choice upon receipt of the payment 
or at any time thereafter. (Emphasis 
added.) 
17. Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided as follows: 
3. It is agreed that, at the time 
of execution of this Memorandum, Buyer 
has paid to Seller the sum of 
$620,000.00 which will release from the 
Deed of Trust three (3) PUD lots. Upon 
the recordation of the PUD Plat and 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions 
and Restrictions with the Summit County 
Recorder, Buyer shall be entitled to 
the release from the Deed of Trust of 
three (3) PUD lots of Buyer's choice 
together with the said roadway. (Em-
phasis added.) 
18. Paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
/ided as follows: 
5. The proposed plat is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this ref-
erence incorporated herein. Seller 
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hereby acknowledges and agrees to exe-
cute as a lienholder the original plat 
prior to recordation. Changes in the 
proposed plat and the Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 
when prepared shall be subject to the 
reasonable approval of Seller" [Em-
phasis added.) 
19. The proposed plat, Exhibit WAM attached to the Memo-
randum of Closing Terms included a boundary description de-
scribing all of the Subject Property and an Owner's Dedica-
tion. The Owner's Dedication is a standard printed form used 
by J.J. Johnson, parallels dedications used in the city limits 
of Park City and is commonly used in plats to dedicate roads 
to public use, not as a dedication for a private road as orig-
inally contemplated in the EIS. The Owner's Dedication pro-
vides in pertinent part as follows: 
Know all by these present that we the 
undersigned owners of the herein de-
scribed tract of land, having caused 
the same to be subdivided into lots 
and streets to hereafter be known as 
White Pine Ranches Subdivision, do 
hereby dedicate for perpetual use of 
the public all parcels of land shown 
on this plat as intended for public 
use, and do warrant, defend, and save 
the city harmless against any ease-
ments or other encumbrances on the 
dedicated streets which will interfere 
with the city's use, operation, and 
maintenance of the streets and do fur-
ther dedicate the easements as shown. 
(Emphasis added.) 
(Exhibit 20). 
20. Paragraph 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided in part as follows: 
6. Seller agrees to grant to Sum-
mit County the ten and one-half (10-
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1/2) foot strip of land outlined in 
red on Exhibit "A". Said conveyance 
shall be for the sole purpose of 
widening the County roadway. If pos-
sible, such grant shall be in the form 
of an easement. The County indicates 
that it is possible that the County 
road as it exists is not where it is 
platted. 
21. The County roadway has not been widened, there are no 
current plans to do so, and Summit County has never requested 
such an easement from plaintiffs or the Sharps. (See Exhibit 
107, p. 15; Exhibit 87, p. 8; and Exhibit 34). 
22. Paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided in pertinent part as follows: 
7. Buyer agrees to provide Seller 
with one (1) sewer connection and one 
(1) culinary water connection into Buy-
er's systems at such time as each is 
available, and Seller shall pay a con-
nection fee and service fee equal to 
the pro rata cost to the purchaser of a 
lot in Buyer's proposed PUD plus any 
charges of Summit Water Distributing 
Company. The sewer and water connec-
tion granted above can be used by Sell-
er in new construction if allowed on 
the 8.5 acre parcel or for connection 
to the existing residence of Seller.... 
(Emphasis added.) 
23. Subsequent to closing, attorney Jon Heaton represent-
ed Saunders in continuing plaintiffs' attempts, begun prior to 
closing, to obtain County approval of a private road for the 
development. (Exhibit 127). 
24. Before signing the Closing Documents, on June 16, 
1981 and subsequently on November 1, 1983, Plaintiff White 
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Pine Ranches entered into sewer extension agreements with the 
SBSID to install a sewer trunk line up White Pine Canyon pur-
suant to which agreements White Pine Ranches would receive 
reimbursement for their- construction costs of the sewer line 
to the development from connection fees charged to third par-
ties connecting to that line: 
Said third parties will be allowed to 
connect to such lines only upon payment 
to the District of the applicable num-
ber of connection fees. The District 
shall retain $100 plus the actual costs 
of construction and inspection from 
each such connection fee and pay the 
balance of each such connection fee to 
Applicant [White Pine Ranches]. 
(Exhibits 80 55(c) and 81 I5C). 
25. At the time plaintiffs were trying to obtain County 
approval of the development and agreeing to run the sewer line 
to Subject Property, it was anticipated that additional devel-
opments by third parties would occur in the White Pine Canyon 
vicinity, including the development of a ski resort in White 
Pine Canyon and the development of adjoining parcels of land, 
all of which future developments would hook into the sewer 
trunk line plaintiffs were to construct, allowing plaintiffs 
the opportunity to recoup expenditures for the sewer system 
through the connection fees paid pursuant to the provisions of 
the line extension agreements. (Exhibits 104, 105, 107 and 
117). 
26. On June 30, 1982, White Pine Ranches paid the Sharps 
the installment payment of $308,177.69, by check (Exhibit 44) 
-10-
enclosed with a cover letter from Felton stating: "Upon final 
plat approval, we will notify you to obtain the releases for 
the lots and the road as per the contract." (Exhibit 21). 
27. On June 28, 1983 and June 30, 1983, Felton and 
Saunders Land Investment Corporation paid to the Sharps the 
sum of $178,165.23 by two checks in the amount of $71,266.09 
and $106,899.14 respectively. (Exhibit 44). The remaining 
portion of the June 30, 1983 installment payment due from 
plaintiffs, a check from Dan Hunter in the amount of 
$106,849.14 was returned for insufficient funds, resulting in 
a default in the June 30, 19823 installment payment. (Exhibit 
22). 
28. On or about July 19, 1983, while the June 30, 1983 
payment was in default and prior to the recordation of a final 
plat on the Subject Property, Felton wrote a letter to attor-
ney Jon Heaton, inquiring about obtaining a release from the 
Sharps of the road and five lots. The letter further ex-
plained that a final plat had not been recorded because M[a]s 
soon as we file the plat real estate taxes are going to go up 
significantly, which we would like to avoid until we have an 
actual buyer for one of the lots." (Exhibit 23). 
29. On or about September 23, 1983, a Notice of Default 
was filed pursuant to the Trust Deed on the Subject Property 
for the default in the June 30, 1983 payment. (Exhibit 24.) 
30. Plaintiffs made no claim during 1983 that the Sharps 
had breached the Closing Documents. 
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31. On or about November 14, 1983, the June 30, 1983 de-
fault under the Trust Deed was cured with a payment in the sum 
of $118,397.39 from Saunders Land Investment Corporation (Ex-
hibits 4 and 44). 
32. On or about November 18, 1983, attorney Jon Heaton 
sent a letter to the Sharps enclosing for their approval a 
proposed final plat, which was later recorded with Summit 
County (hereinafter the proposed Hfinal plat"), and a Declara-
tion of Protective Covenants (hereinafter "CCRs"), which Dec-
laration was prepared on behalf of Saunders by Heaton and 
which contained covenants, conditions and restrictions for use 
of respecting a portion of the Subject Property by lot owners. 
(Exhibit 25). 
33. The proposed final plat enclosed with the November 18, 
1983 letter did not plat the entire approximately 60 acre par-
cel as originally contemplated in the Earnest Money and the 
Memorandum of Closing Terms, but platted only the northern 
portion of the Subject Property into six PUD lots, leaving the 
southern portion (approximately 27 acres) of the Subject Prop-
erty unplatted (hereinafter the "unplatted acreage"). (Exhib-
it 1). 
34. The proposed final plat included an Owner's Dedica-
tion for a private road in the PUD and delineated the exist-
ence and location of the private road and certain utility 
easements, including easements for water lines, water tank and 
water systems. (Exhibit 1). 
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35. The November 18, 1983 letter from attorney Jon Heaton 
to the Sharps further provided in pertinent part that: 
At a later time in the near future, Hy 
[Saunders] has indicated he will seek 
release of Lots 1 through 5 of the 
platted subdivision along with his road 
(White Pine Lane).... We will handle 
that matter when it is presented.... 
When those releases are made, pursuant 
to your instruction we will insure that 
rights are reserved in« White Pine Lane 
for access for the southern portions of 
the property purchased from you until 
your Deed of Trust is fully paid. (Em-
phasis added.) 
(Exhibit 25 and 25a). 
36. On or about November 21, 1983, Felton mailed a letter 
to Jon Heaton regarding the November 18, 1983 letter to John 
Sharp. The letter provided in pertinent part: HIt is per-
fectly acceptable to us that he [Mr. Sharp] retain an easement 
over White Pine Lane to the southern part of his property as 
well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road up to the western 
boundary of Lot 6." (Exhibit 26). 
37. On or about November 28, 1983, Felton had a telephone 
conversation with attorney Heaton memorialized by notes of 
« 
attorney Heaton in the margin of Felton's November 21, 1983 
letter (Exhibit 26). Felton agreed that "access over road 
[White Pine Lane] retained if Sharp develops undeveloped prop-
erty Lots 7-12 White Pine Ranch.- (Exhibit 26a). 
38. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps authorized 
the recording of a Cancellation of Notice of Default relating 
to the June 30, 1983 payment (Exhibit 27). 
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39. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps, in consi-
deration of the agreement of plaintiffs to allow them access 
over the private roadway (White Pine Lane) in the event of 
foreclosure, and pursuant to their right of approval under 
paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms, also executed 
a Consent to Record Phase I of White Pine Ranches, which Con-
sent after setting forth the metes and bounds description of 
Phase I of White Pine Ranches granted: 
[A] non-exclusive easement for water 
lines, water tank and water systems 
over, under and across the property, 
shown here near the southwest corner of 
the subject property, and specifically 
described in the Declaration of Pro-
tective Covenants and reserving unto 
the owners, for granting to the owners 
of adjacent or nearby property, a 
non-exclusive easement for utilities 
and vehicular and pedestrian access 
over the private roadway shown on the 
plat and from the well sites as de-
veloped. (Emphasis added.) 
[Exhibit 51). As additional consideration for signing the 
Consent to Record, the Sharps permitted the platting of only a 
portion of the Subject Property. 
40. The proposed final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I 
sent to the Sharps for approval on November 18, 1983 was re-
corded on December 23, 1983 in the office of the Summit County 
Recorder following the execution of the Consent to Record by 
the Sharps. (Exhibit 1). The CCRs were also recorded in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder on December 23, 1983 and 
the Consent to Record was attached as an exhibit thereto. 
(Exhibit 51). 
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41. After recordation of the final plat, the CCRs and the 
Consent to Record, plaintiffs proceeded with construction of 
the improvements on the Subject Property. However, instead of 
adopting any of the alternatives described in Finding No. 6, 
supra, plaintiffs constructed a small, private water system 
for this development. 
42. On or about January 18, 1984, the Sharps executed a 
direction to the Trustee under the Deed of Trust to release 
from the Deed of Trust Lots 1 through 5 of White Pine Ranches 
(Exhibit 28). 
43. The Partial Reconveyance of Lots 1 through 5 directed 
and authorized by the Sharps, was not prepared by Associated 
Title, the trustee under the Trust Deed, until January 7, 1986 
and was recorded March 26, 1986 (Exhibit 45). No explanation 
of the delay in preparing the Partial Reconveyance was provid-
ed at trial. Plaintiffs, although naming Associated Title as 
a defendant in this action, chose not to serve or pursue and 
question Associated Title for such delay. No other request 
for reconveyance was authorized by the Sharps. 
44. On or about January 20, 1984, Felton sent a letter to 
attorney Heaton expressing astonishment that the deeds to Lots 
1 through 5 had not been received but stating, "I realize that 
the deeds for the road may be difficult to do." (Exhibit 30). 
45. On or about January 17, 1984, Felton sent a letter to 
attorney Heaton requesting the approval by the Sharps of a 
••multi-family development- on the unplatted acreage, "which is 
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the only way it [the development] will be economically feasi-
ble.H (Exhibit 29). A multi-family concept was never adopt-
ed. 
46. Felton testified at trial and affirmed on May 7, 1986 
in a letter sent to the Sharps that the plaintiffs "were in a 
position to prepare and obtain approval of that plat [for the 
unplatted acreage] immediately.r (Trial Transcript, p. 110, 
hereinafter "R.w 110 and Exhibit 37). 
47. It was the actual practice of plaintiffs and a re-
quirement of paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms to 
make specific requests for the release of specific PUD lots 
from the Sharps after required payments were made and provided 
no defaults existed under the Closing Documents. (R. 334). 
48. Property taxes on the unreleased property (Lot 6 and 
the unplatted acreage) became delinquent pursuant to law on 
November 30, 1984 when plaintiffs failed to pay all of the 
1984 property taxes due on the Subject Property (Stipulation 
of counsel at Trial) in violation of paragraphs 5 and 14 of 
the Trust Deed, which provided in paragraph 5 that the Trustor 
[plaintiffs] agrees "to pay at least 10 days before delinquen-
cy all taxes and assessments affecting said property...." 
(Exhibit 2). 
49. Except for $1,515.24 in property taxes paid on the 
unplatted acreage in 1984, no taxes have been paid on the 
unreleased Subject Property (Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage) 
subsequent to November 30, 1984, and including 1985, 1986 and 
1987 (Stipulation of counsel at Trial), and plaintiffs, there-
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foref remained in default under the provisions of paragraphs 5 
and 14 of the Trust Deed. 
50. Plaintiffs paid the 1984 installment payment. However, 
on or about June 27, 1985, the Sharps received only a portion 
of the June 30, 1985 installment payment in the form of a 
check from Felton in the amount of $59,709.47 (Exhibit 44). 
51. As a result of plaintiffs1 defaults, a Notice of 
Default was recorded on September 16, 1985 covering the Sub-
ject Property as described in the Trust Deed, which descrip-
tion included Lots 1-5. (Exhibit 55). 
52. On or about September 24, 1985, Felton sent a 
letter to Mr. Sharp acknowledging receipt of the September 
1985 Notice of Default and assuring him "every attempt is be-
ing made to resolve the problem...." (Exhibit 31). Felton, 
in his letter made no allegation that the Sharps had slandered 
plaintiffs' title as a result of the inclusion of Lots 1-5 in 
the Notice of Default nor did Felton or any other plaintiff 
allege in 1984 or 1985 any breach of Closing Documents by the 
Sharps. 
53. Significantly, as bearing upon the credibility of 
plaintiffs' arguments is the fact unrebutted that plaintiffs 
made no claims whatsoever of breach by the Sharps until after 
their own admitted breaches of the Closing Documents. (Ex-
hibit 31). 
54. On or about January 10, 1986, Felton wrote a letter 
to Blake G. Heiner of Associated Title Company, the Trustee 
under the Trust Deed, informing him that the Notice of Default 
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(Exhibit 55) and Amended Notice of Sale (Exhibit 56) covering 
the Subject Property included Lots 1 through 5 which were to 
have been released, pursuant to the Sharps' direction. (Ex-
hibit 57). 
55. In response to Felton's letter (Exhibit 57), Blake 
Heiner for Associated Title Company prepared and recorded an 
Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale against the Subject Property, 
excluding Lots 1 through 5. (Exhibit 58). Other Notices 
filed subsequently against the Subject Property also excluded 
Lots 1 through 5. (Exhibits 3 and 36). 
56. All of the Notices of Default and Notices of 
Trustee's Sale recorded against the Subject Property specif-
ically provided that such Notices are: 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments, 
Restrictions, Rights-of-Way and matters 
of record enforceable in law (sic) 
equity. 
(Exhibits 5, 36, 55, 56, and 58). 
57. No payment at all was made when the final install-
ment under the Closing Documents was due on June 30, 1986. 
58. The balance owing to the Sharps under the Trust Deed 
Note through March 22, 1988 is $557,642.46, including 
$371,739.35 principal; $23,113.33 interest at 12%; $147,920.21 
default interest at 18%; and $14,869.52 late payment charges 
of 4% on each overdue payment. Interest is accruing at a per 
diem rate of $183.32. (Exhibit 122). 
59. Plaintiffs made no written or oral request for the 
release of the roadway or Lot 6 prior to their default in 
-18-
November 1984, when the 1984 property taxes became delinquent, 
and prior to their default in failing to make the entire 1985 
installment payment when due. Plaintiffs' first requests were 
made for such releases on February 27, 1986 and May 7, 1986, 
respectively. (Exhibits 35 and 37). Also for the first time 
in the letter dated February 27, 1986, plaintiffs requested a 
release from the Sharps for 7.S acres of the unplatted acre-
age, despite the provision in paragraphs 1-3 of the Memorandum 
of Closing Terms for the release by the Sharps of "PUD lots" 
only. As of these dates, plaintiffs were still and are in of 
default for the 1984 and 1985 property taxes and the payment a 
portion of the 1985 payment and the full 1986 payment required 
under the Addendum to the Trust Deed Note. 
60. The Sharps perceived that the execution by them of 
the Consent to Record constituted substantial performance of 
any obligation to release the roadway pursuant to paragraphs 3 
and 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
61. As plaintiff Felton testified, Mthe contract [Memo-
randum of Closing Terms] says lots of buyer's choice and that 
would require a choice.H After the release of Lots 1-5, 
plaintiffs may have chosen to prepare a plat of the then un-
platted acreage and seek a release of a portion of it instead 
of Lot 6. 
62. Also in the letter of February 27, 1986, Felton de-
manded from the Sharps for the first time approximately 
$73,000.00 as their "cost of the sewer and water hook-ups 
which are now available." (Exhibit 35). No demand for such 
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costs had been made of the Sharps prior to that time nor had 
plaintiffs provided an accounting of such costs. Before 
trial, plaintiffs claimed exorbitant expenses of $1,638,753.61 
for the complete costs for the construction of the improve-
ments on and to the Subject Property (Exhibit 32a). 
63. At trial, plaintiffs claimed costs for the construc-
tion of improvements on and to the Subject Property of 
$1,063,348.10, (Exhibit 60) and plaintiffs modified their de-
mand from the Sharps for water and sewer connection fees to 
$43,706.00. (Exhibit 66). 
64. Prior to actual construction of the sewer system, 
Saunders told the Summit County Planning Commission in a 
meeting on December 14, 1982 that they "would really like to 
have the septic tank system used because of the high cost of 
the sewer line but in the long run it may be the best way to 
go." (Exhibit 79). On or about September 16, 1983, Felton 
wrote Summit County challenging the requirement "to install a 
sewer line up the County road from Highway U-224 to the 
Project, a distance of about one and one-half (1-1/2) miles." 
(Exhibit 79). Felton concluded the letter by declaring: "In 
the event we are required to install the sewer line, we will 
test the validity of that requirement in court." 
65. Plaintiffs made formal demand upon Summit County on 
or about July 26, 1984 for, inter alia, the following damages: 
The sum of $117,297.15 being the 
costs of off-site sewer which we 
were, under protest, required to 
install to service the subdivision. 
*** 
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[W]e [plaintiffs] have lost one sale or 
more sales and anticipate the damages, 
loss of profit and interest at between 
$250,000 and $500,000. 
* * • 
[Dlamages for the loss of sale, reduction 
in business and damages suffered in reduc-
tion to profit .... 
(Exhibit 84). 
66. Soon thereafter plaintiffs brought suit in the United 
States District Court, District of Utah, Civil No. C84-2G90W, 
against Summit County, the SBSID and various officials thereof 
to recover their claimed damages. 
67. In answer to interrogatories dated December 28, 1984 
in the Federal Court litigation, plaintiffs stated: 
Because of the imposition of the re-
quirement that Plaintiffs construct an 
off-site sewer approximately one mile in 
length, the costs of developing the 
entire project became prohibitive. 
(Exhibit 116; see also, Exhibit 107, p. 7). 
68. In further interrogatory answers on March 31, 1986, 
Saunders declared: 
At the present time I have recently found 
out that the right-of-way servicing my 
property has been forfeited by Summit 
County contrary to law. This will not 
allow my development to proceed, will not 
allow me to recover costs for the capital 
improvement and significantly diminishes 
the value of the property. 
(Exhibit 107, p. 15). 
69. In Saunders1 Federal Court affidavit dated March 17, 
1986, he also swore: 
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10. As a result of the various 
delays [caused by the County and the 
SBSID], which are detailed below, the 
market for exclusive building lots is now 
virtually non-existent, cost of improve-
ments escalated to be several times what 
I ha.: anticipated, and much of the real 
property in the project is threatened by 
foreclosure. 
(Exhibit 86, p. 3). 
70. Most of the damages sought to be recovered by the 
plaintiffs in the lawsuit against the SBSID and Summit County 
are the same damages plaintiffs sought to recover from the 
Sharps in the present case. (R. 252 and 263; cf. Exhibits 60 
with 86; see also Exhibits 87, 88, 107, 116 and Plaintiffs1 
Verified Complaint herein). 
71. No written or oral claim of default on the part of 
the Sharps under the Closing Documents was made by the plain-
tiffs until February 27, 1986, subsequent to plaintiffs' own 
defaults in failing to pay the 1984 and 1985 property taxes 
and failing to pay the full 1985 payment required under the 
Addendum to the Trust Deed Note. 
72. The Sharps did not interfere with plaintiffs' 
• attempts to market or sell the Subject Property. 
= 73. Plaintiffs received only one invitation for an offer 
| to purchase Lot 1 or Lot 6, which invitation was not consum-
§a mated due to the failure of conditions imposed by the one, 
2| B. F. Sammons, and the failure of such conditions were unre-
al 
lated to any actions or statements of the Sharps. (Exhibit 
88). 
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74. One of the conditions of purchase by Sammons was an 
independent appraisal supporting a $220,000 proposed sales 
price (Exhibit 88). The plaintiffs provided Sammons with a 
letter appraisal, dated August 8, 1986, which had been pre-
pared by LeRoy Pia. (Exhibit 9a). This appraisal stated that 
Lots 1 and 6 had a fair market value of $220,000. On or 
about November 11, 1986, while Sammons and Saunders were still 
negotiating, a letter appraisal was obtained by Steve Clyde, 
attorney for the plaintiffs from the same appraiser, valuing 
the lots at an average of only $190,000.00 (Exhibit 9). The 
November 11, 1986 appraisal was not shown to Sammons. (R. 
283-4). 
75. Saunders had given Sammons "the impression" that 
plaintiffs could convey Lot 6 to him even though it had not 
been released from the Trust Deed. (R. 389; see also R. 284). 
76. On or about March 24, 1987, Felton, pursuant to the 
request of the real estate agent, Steve Clegg, employed by 
plaintiffs to list Lots 1, 2 and 5, wrote a letter to Clegg 
for dissemination to other Park City real estate agents, which 
letter stated H[t]he current litigation does not affect the 
marketability or encumber that [Subject] property." (Exhibit 
89.) 
77. After the commencement of this action, the Sharps 
took all reasonable steps to facilitate the sale and marketing 
of the Subject Property as evidenced by a letter dated Septem-
ber 30, 1986, to plaintiffs1 prior attorney, Steven Clyde, who 
was notified by Donald J. Winder, the Sharps * attorney, that 
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the Sharps would take all steps reasonable to effect a sale of 
Lot 6 or the unplatted acreage (Exhibit 33), and the Sharps1 
Motion to Appoint a Receiver for the Subject Property in this 
proceeding dated May 14, 1987. 
78. There have been no arms length sales to purchasers of 
PUD lots at the Subject Property wherein sewer and water con-
nection and service fees have been assessed. The only convey-
ance of a PUD lot has been to Felton, a member of the partner-
ships. At trial, plaintiffs testified that they intended, at 
all times, to include the cost of the sewer and water connec-
tion and service fees within the sales price of lots. (R. 
310-312). 
79. Mr. Sammons was not to be charged any sum above and 
beyond a $220,000 land price for sewer or water connection 
fees. (R. 285). 
80. Felton testified that a purchaser of one of the PUD 
lots listed with real estate agent Clegg would only be charged 
"over and above ... the purchase price" "the hook-up fee to be 
charged by Snyderville Basin for sewer." (R. 310). 
81. If plaintiffs sold a lot to Sammons at $220,000, they 
would not have been "compensated for those [sewer and water] 
improvement costs...." At a $220,000 sales price it's "impos-
sible" to recover the costs of sewer and water improvements to 
the Subject Property. MYou have to take a loss." (R. 311-
312). 
82. The sewer system, as of the date of trial, is not 
completed or operational, nor has its construction been 
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approved by the SBSID. (Exhibits 83, 83a and 99 through 103). 
The culinary water system as of the date of trial is also not 
operational. Under paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing 
Terms, the Sharps do not have to pay connection fees for these 
systems until they are "available.M (Exhibit 15). 
83. The sewer system constructed by plaintiffs has a 
capacity to handle between 2,QQ£ and 3,800 connections. (Ex-
hibit 86). 
84. Under the line extension agreements with the SBSID, a 
connection fee "at the rate in effect at the time of connec-
tion" shall be determined by the SBSID for the system on the 
Subject Property (Exhibit 81, paragraph 4D; see Exhib-
it 80, paragraph 4(d)). The "connection fee shall be paid by 
the property owner" before issuance of a building permit, to 
the Application (the plaintiffs herein), except that the 
SBSID, shall be entitled to "the first $100 of the connection 
fee." 
85. The parties intended the language in the Earnest 
Money concerning "same per-hook-up price" to be synonymous 
with the language contained in paragraph 7, Memorandum of 
Closing Terms, regarding "pro rata cost" to a PUD lot purchas-
er. 
86. Average and reasonable connection fees for culinary 
water and sewer systems in the Park City and Snyderville Basin 
area are $2,000.00 each. (See Testimony of John C. Brown and 
Rex Ausburn, cf. Exhibit 86, p. 6). 
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87. The Sharps intended and wanted to be charged only 
what purchasers of a PUD lot would be charged as fees to con-
nect to the culinary water and sewer systems on the Subject 
Property, and the plaintiffs should have understood that this 
was the intent of paragraph 7, Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
88. The Sharps repeatedly assured plaintiffs that they 
did not intend, through their foreclosure, to interfere with 
access rights over the private roadway or to the utility ease-
ments shown on the Consent to Record which the Sharps signed. 
(R. 64; Exhibits 33 and 51; cf. Exhibits 25f 25a, 26 and 26a). 
89. Correspondingly, it was both the mutual intent and 
agreement of the parties that the Sharps be granted use of the 
roadway in event of default (Exhibits 25, 25a, 26 and 26a), 
which agreement was later memorialized and recorded in the 
Consent to Record. (Exhibit 51). 
90. The inclusion of Lots 1 through 5 in the September 
1985 Notice of Default (Exhibit 55) and December 1985 Amended 
Notice of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit 56) was inadvertent, un-
intentional and without malice. 
91. In refusing to reconvey Lot 6, the road, the unplat-
ted acreage, the Sharps acted in good faith and relied on the 
advice of attorney Jon Heaton. 
92. The Sharps have been charged trustees' fees by 
Associated Title in their efforts to foreclose the Subject 
Property in the amount of $1,803.80 (Exhibit 42). 
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93. Plaintiffs have not suffered any damages, special or 
otherwise, as a result of any act or failure to act by the 
Sharps. 
94. Paragraph 13 of the Trust Deed provides that failure 
to promptly enforce any right thereunder does "not constitute 
a waiver of any other right or subsequent default." (Exhibit 
2). 
95. On September 4, 1986, the day before the scheduled 
Trustee's Sale, plaintiffs filed a Complaint commencing this 
action and obtained the issuance of a Temporary Restraining 
Order (TRO) from Judge Judith M. Billings to restrain the 
Sharps from conducting the Trustee's Sale of the Subject Prop-
erty. The TRO required a bond in the amount of $2,400. In a 
hearing held on January 4, 1988, this Court required that the 
bond be increased to $50,000 "to protect the Sharps for the 
payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suf-
fered if the Sharps are found to have been wrongfully enjoined 
or restrained...." 
96. The Trust Deed Note provided that if it "is collected 
by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or 
interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned ... 
agree to pay ... a reasonable attorney's fee." (Exhibit 3)., 
Paragraph 16 of the Trust Deed provided: "Upon the 
occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary [the Sharps] 
shall have the option to . •. foreclose the Trust Deed ... and 
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover ... a reasonable 
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attorney's fee...." (Exhibit 2; see also 1111 thereof). Fur-
ther, paragraph 6 of the Trust Deed provided that Beneficiary 
(the Sharps) may "commence, appear in and defend any action or 
proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the 
rights of [sic] powers of Beneficiary ... and in exercising 
any such powers ... employ counsel, and pay his reasonable 
fees." Additionally, paragraph 7 of the Trust Deed requires 
Trustor to "pay immediately and without demand all sums ex-
pended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest from 
date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per 
annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured 
hereby." Paragraph 11 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-
vided that "the defaulting party shall pay all expenses of 
enforcing the same or any right arising out of breach or de-
fault thereof, including reasonable attorneys' fees, whether 
incurred with or without suit and both before and after judg-
ment." (Exhibit 15). 
97. Legal services have been rendered to the Sharps by 
the law firm of Winder & Haslam in the nature of time expended 
by individual members, through August 31, 1988, in the amount 
z « of $144,469.75. 
2 z 98. The foregoing amount does not include any services 
8 t performed on or after August 31, 1988, including those servic-
< | £ 
1 sopSa es of Winder & Haslam necessary for finalizing the Findings of 
o«il;j9 Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and preparing for, re-5£°<5
sponding to and arguing any post trial motions. The legal 
fees for such matters may be supplemented later. 
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99. The services rendered by the law firm of Winder & 
Haslam were reasonably necessary for the development of the 
case and protection of the rights of the Sharps; and the rates 
charged are reasonable-and are in accordance with those rates 
generally charged by attorneys in this area for similar ser-
vices. 
100. Plaintiffs breached the Memorandum of Closing Terms 
by, inter alia, failing to make the payments intended thereby 
to the Sharps and by failing to make available sewer and water 
connections at the same charge to purchasers of a PUD lot. 
101. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Memorandum of Closing 
Terms, all "agreements contained [t]herein shall survive the 
closing of this transaction...." (Exhibit 15). 
102. The Sharps' defense of plaintiffs1 Complaint was an 
action purporting to offset the security under the Trust Deed 
and the rights and powers of the Sharps related to collecting 
the Promissory Note after default; related to foreclosing the 
Trust Deed; and related to enforcing the Memorandum of Closing 
Terms and rights arising out of a breach or default thereof. 
103. After closing the sale on the Subject Property, on or 
about July 16, 1981, attorney Heaton represented White Pine 
Ranches relating to the development of the Subject Property 
(R. 789) until the filing by Associated Title of a Notice of 
Default on or about September 16, 1985. (R. 836; Exhibit 55). 
Attorney Heaton did not represent the Sharps between the clos-
ing of the sale and the filing of the first Notice of Default 
on or about September 23, 1983. (R. 791; Exhibit 24). For a 
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period of time after the filing of the first Notice of Default 
on or about September 23, 1983, and after the filing of the 
Notice of Default on September 16, 1985 (R. 793), attorney 
Heaton did represent the Sharps. 
104. The Sharps have incurred costs of court in this ac-
tion. 
Having made the above Findings of Fact, the Court here-
with makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Closing Documents, which term is defined in 
Finding No. 10 above, are the operative documents relating to 
the parties' closing of the sale of the Subject Property by 
the Sharps to the plaintiffs, and this transaction constitutes 
the Contract between the parties (hereinafter the "Contract"). 
2. Plaintiffs, by their failure to pay the 1984, 1985, 
1986 and 1987 property taxes on Lot 6 and the unplatted acre-
age on November 30 of each respective year, are thereby in 
breach of the Trust Deed. 
3. Plaintiffs1 failure to pay the entire June 30, 1985 
installment payment and the 30, 1986 final installment payment 
required pursuant to paragraph ID and IE of the Addendum to 
the Trust Deed Note constitutes a breach of the Trust Deed 
Note, Trust Deed and Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
4. Plaintiffs' breaches were material, significant and 
continuing and were uncured when plaintiffs releases were 
first requested by plaintiffs for the roadway and Lot 6 on 
February 27, 1986 and again on May 7, 1986. 
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5. The breaches by plaintiffs of the Contract occurred 
prior in time to any alleged breaches by the Sharps, and this 
Court specifically holds there were no material or significant 
breaches on the part of the Sharps of their obligations under 
the parties' Contract. 
6. The Sharps have substantially complied with all of 
their obligations under the terms of the parties1 Contract* 
7. Plaintiffs were obligated, under the terms of the 
Memorandum of Closing Terms and pursuant to their own prac-
tice, to specifically request and identify lots, including Lot 
6, for release by the Sharps. 
8. Because the plaintiffs' material and continuing 
breaches of the parties' Contract preceded timely plaintiffs' 
requests for reconveyance of Lot 6, the roadway and the un-
platted acreage, defendants were not obligated to reconvey Lot 
6, the roadway and the unplatted acreage. 
9. The Sharps were justified in and were excused from 
performance under the Contract to reconvey Lot 6, the roadway 
or the unplatted acreage shown on the final plat of to the 
plaintiffs because the plaintiffs were in breach of the par-
ties' Contract at the time such reconveyances were requested. 
10. Alternatively, the Sharps' execution of the Consent 
to Record the final plat of and the CCRs constituted a release 
of the roadway shown on such plat in accordance with para-
graphs 3 and 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms. 
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11. The execution of the Consent to Record by the Sharps 
and the subsequent recordation of the final plat and the CCRs 
created a non-exclusive appurtenant easements to run with the 
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable 
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and 
benefit of the unplatted acreage and the owners and purchasers 
thereof (including the Sharps), and their invitees, guests, 
heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and for access 
to and the right to use as a means for ingress and egress for 
vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and across the 
private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the recorded final 
plat, and a non-exclusive appurtenant easement to run with the 
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable 
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and 
benefit of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the owners and pur-
chasers thereof (including the Sharps) and their heirs and 
successors in interest for water lines, water tank and water 
systems over, under and across the Subject Property near the 
southwest corner of the unplatted acreage as shown on the 
final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I. 
12. The Sharps are estopped to deny the dedication of 
White Pine Lane, pursuant to the final recorded plat, for the 
private use of the parcel owners, their invitees and guests, 
subject to the CCRs and the non-exclusive appurtenant easement 
for the use and benefit of the unplatted acreage described in 
Conclusion No. 11 above. Further, the Sharps are estopped to 
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deny the non-exclusive utility easement also described in Con-
clusion No. 11 above. 
13. The Sharps, by the execution of the Consent to Re-
cord, are estopped to deny the operative and legal effect of 
the recordation of the final plat and CCRs and the rights and 
obligations of the owners of PUD lots as set forth in the re-
corded final plat and CCRs for White Pine Ranches Phase I. 
The final recorded plat and CCRs and the non-exclusive ease-
ments set forth in Conclusion No. 11 above shall remain in 
full force and effect, and not be affected by the foreclosure 
ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's Sale, or a subse-
quent redemption of the subject premises, other than a com-
plete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs herein coupled with 
plaintiffs1 declaration for the extinguishment of the non-
exclusive easement in favor of the unplatted acreage. 
14. Owners and purchasers of the unplatted acreage (in-
cluding the Sharps), and their successors in interest are en-
titled to use of the private roadway (White Pine Lane) for 
access to the unplatted acreage of the Subject Property as set 
forth in the legal description attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
and incorporated by reference herein, as a result of the 
mutual intent and agreements between the parties to grant to 
the Sharps the use of the roadway, which agreement was memori-
alized by the letters of Heaton and Felton and evidenced by 
the part performance and reliance of the Sharps on such let-
ters and agreements in executing the Consent to Record. 
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15. General partners in a partnership are bound by the 
actions of other partners taken on behalf of the partnership 
and by the actions of the partnership itself. 
16. The language in paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of 
Closing Terms "pro rata cost to the purchaser" is ambiguous, 
necessitating the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret the 
same. 
17. The extrinsic evidence presented at trial demon-
strated that the parties intended to allow the Sharps, at 
their request, one connection each to both the culinary water 
and sewer systems when and if such systems are available and 
operational. 
18. The construction costs of the culinary water and 
sewer systems claimed by the plaintiffs are not reasonable, in 
violation of the reasonable value rule. 
19. Seven years is an unreasonable time within which to 
complete the culinary water and sewer systems and require the 
Sharps to mandatorily hook into these systems, which systems 
still are not yet operational• The Sharps are not obligated, 
but have the option, to hook into the culinary water and sewer 
systems should such systems become operational• 
20. It is an unreasonable interpretation of the language 
"pro rata costs" in the Memorandum of Closing Terms and the 
earlier language in the Earnest Money delineating "the same 
per-hook-up price" to require the Sharps to pay 1/13 of the 
exorbitant construction costs for culinary water and sewer 
hook-ups. Such an interpretation would recast the Sharps as 
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developers rather than the mere sellers of Subject Property 
that they were and intended to be in this transaction. 
21. A reasonable fee to be paid by the Sharps to the 
plaintiffs for a connection to the culinary water and sewer 
systems is $2,000.00 each. 
22. The inclusion of Lots 1-5 in the initial Notice of 
Default (Exhibit 55) and Notice of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit 
56) on behalf of the Sharps was inadvertent, unintentional and 
without malice. 
23. There was no improper holding by the Sharps of any 
requested reconveyance, but even if there were, it was not 
done in bad faith. The Sharps acted in reliance on the advice 
of their counsel, and did so in good faith. 
24. Alternatively, the Sharps did not improperly withhold 
reconveyances and plaintiffs have failed to establish a cause 
of action for failure to reconvey under U.C.A. §57-1-33. 
U.C.A. S57-1-33 is applicable only when a beneficiary refuses 
to request a reconveyance within 30 days after written demand 
therefor is made by the Trustor. The Sharps requested the 
Trustee to reconvey Lots 1-5 on or about January 18, 1984, and 
2 . because of plaintiffs' subsequent breaches were under no obll-
o I 
£ 1 gation to reconvey the remainder of the Subject Property. 
i -
8
 x | 25. As a result of plaintiffs' breaches of the Contract, 
< * >% 
8 amUa t n e Sharps were entitled to record all of the Notices of De-
|||i2i fault and Notices of Sale described in the Findings against 
*• 5 R O < S 
the Subject Property. 
-35-
26. The Sharps acted in good faith and not maliciously in 
having recorded the Notices of Default and the Notices of Sale 
and in refusing to reconvey Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage. 
27. The plaintiffs have not established a cause of action 
for slander of title against the Sharps. The Sharps did not 
act maliciously or cause any special damages to the plain-
tiffs. 
28. All of the damages, including, without limitation, 
those under U.C.A. S57-1-33, claimed by the plaintiffs are too 
remote, conjectural and speculative. The plaintiffs have 
failed to establish they have suffered actual damages result-
ing from any alleged breach by the Sharps, and this Court con-
cludes no such breach by the Sharps occurred. 
29. The attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps in this 
matter through August 31, 1988 in the amount of $144,469.75 
are reasonable and the Sharps are entitled to an award of the 
same. Further, the Sharps are entitled to supplement and aug-
ment this amount by affidavit for their reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of the 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any post-
trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution or 
otherwise, and, if necessary, after prevailing on any appeal. 
30. The Sharps are entitled to their costs of court in 
the amount as assessed or taxed pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54 and to 
post-judgment interest as provided by law. 
31. By virtue of the significant and material breaches of 
the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Sharps are entitled to 
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judgment against Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc. 
and Norton, jointly and severally, in the following amounts: 
a. i. Principal: $ 371,739.35 
ii. Interest through 
March 22, 1988: $ 171,033.54 
iii. Late payment charge: $ 14,869.57 
TOTAL: $ 557,642.46 
together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of 
$183.32 from and after March 22, 1988. 
b. i. Trustee's fees: 
ii. Court Costs: 
iii. Attorneys' fees through 
August 31, 1988: 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per 
annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until 
paid by plaintiffs. 
c. Delinquent property taxes: $ 20,368.62 
together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as 
provided by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and 
post-judgment interest thereon at the rate of 12% per 
annum. 
32. As a result of the significant and material breaches 
of the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Temporary Restraining 
Order entered in the above captioned matter by the Honorable 
Judith M. Billings on September 4, 1986 was wrongfully issued 
and the Sharps are entitled to have it lifted and dissolved. 
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33. The Sharps are entitled to be paid the bond posted by 
plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September 1986 in 
the amount of $2,400 and to be paid from the security posted 
by Tracy Collins Bank in the amount of $30,970.63 for their 
interest, attorney's fees and other damages incurred as a re-
sult of the issuance of the wrongful Temporary Restraining 
Order and for which amounts the Sharps are not secured by the 
fair market value of the Subject Property. 
34. The Sharps are entitled to have Lot 6 as described in 
the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the 
unplatted property more particularly described on Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto or such portions thereof as may be sufficient 
to pay the amounts found to be due and owing under the Judg-
ment, together with interest as set forth hereinabove and 
accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, sold at public 
auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, in the 
manner prescribed by law for such sales; that said Sheriff, if 
and when the subject premises are sold by him, out of the pro-
ceeds of such sale shall retain first his costs, disbursements 
and commission, and then pay to the Sharps, or to their attor-
. neys, the accrued and accruing costs of this action, then said 
= sums for the Sharps' attorney's fees, and the amount owing to 
2 the Sharps for principal, interest, costs and expenses of sale 
* Or* and maintenance, taxes, assessments and/or insurance premiums, 
S * « 
I^S together with accrued interest thereon, or so much of said 
o <S 
sums as said proceeds will pay, and that the surplus, if any, 
shall be accounted for and paid over to the Clerk of this 
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Court subject to this Court's further order. 
35. All persons having an interest in the subject premis-
es shall have the right, upon producing satisfactory proof of 
interest, to redeem the same within the time provided by law 
for such redemption; that from and after the expiration of the 
period of redemption as provided by law, that the plaintiffs 
above named, and each of them, and all persons claiming by, 
through or under them, or any of them, shall be forever barred 
and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and estate in and 
to the subject premises, and that from and after the delivery 
of the Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises that the 
grantees named therein be given possession thereof. 
36. If a deficiency results after due and proper applica-
tion of the proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are 
entitled to be awarded a personal judgment against Saunders, 
Felton, Norton and Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, 
jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency. 
37. The Sharps are entitled to have the right, at their 
request, to one connection to both plaintiffs' culinary water 
and sewer systems on White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connec-
tion fee of $2,000 each. 
38. The Sharps are entitled to have the Complaint of the 
plaintiffs dismissed, no cause of action. 
DATED this day of , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
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WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharps 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT 
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpora-
tion; WHITE PINE RANCHES, a 
Utah general partnerhip; 
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a 
Utah general partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE 
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
JOHN C SHARP, and GERALDINE 
Y. SHARP, 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT FELTON, LEON H. 
SAUNDERS; J . RICHARD REES; 
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah c o r p o r a -
t i o n ; KENNETH R. NORTON dba 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C87-1621 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
APPENDIX C 
INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC., 
and PAUL H. LANDES, indivi-
dually; WHITE PINE RANCHES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, 
a Utah general partnership, 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
This cause came on for trial before the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29, 
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the de-
fendants John C. and Geraldine Y. Sharp (hereinafter the 
MSharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A. F. 
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac 
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enter-
prises, Leon H. Saunders (hereinafter "Saunders"), Robert 
Felton (hereinafter "Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders 
Land Investment Corporation appearing by counsel Robert M. 
Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord. Counterclaim 
defendant Kenneth R. Norton ("Norton") appeared through his 
counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and 
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim 
defendant Norton. Defendant Associated Title was never served 
in this action. Counterclaim defendant Paul H. Landes (here-
inafter "Landes") was never served in this action. 
Having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED that plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed, no cause of 
action. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc. and Norton are in-
debted, jointly and severally, to the Sharps in the following 
amounts: 
a. i. Principal: $ 371,739.35 
ii. Interest through 
March 22, 1988: $ 171,033.54 
iii. Late payment charge: $ 14,869.57 
TOTAL: $ 557,642.46 
together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of 
$183.32 from and after March 22, 1988. 
b. i. Trustee's fees: 
ii. Court Costs: 
iii. Attorneys' fees through 
August 31, 1988: 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per 
annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until 
paid by plaintiffs. 
c. Delinquent property taxes: $ 20,368.62 
together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as 
provided by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and 
post-judgment interest thereon at the rate of 12% per 
annum. 
$ 
$ 
$ 
1,803.80 
2,881.04 
144,088.75 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this 
Judgment shall be supplemented and augmented in the amount of 
the Sharps1 reasonable attorney's fees as established by affi-
davit and as incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of 
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any 
post-trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution 
or otherwise, and after prevailing in any appeal. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Temporary Restraining Order entered in the above captioned 
matter by the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4, 
1986 was wrongfully issued and it is hereby lifted and dis-
solved. The Sharps are hereby awarded judgment against the 
bond posted by plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in Sep-
tember, 1986 in the amount of $2,400.00 and against the secur-
ity posted by Tracy Collins Bank with the Clerk of this Court 
in the amount of $28,570.63, and for which amounts the plain-
tiffs are not secured by the fair market value of the subject 
premises. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Lot 6 as 
described in the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches 
Phase I and the unplatted property more particularly described 
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto or such portions thereof as may 
be sufficient to pay the amounts found to be due and owing 
under this Judgment, together with interest as set forth here-
inabove and accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, be 
sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State 
of Utah, in the manner prescribed Ky law for such sales; that 
-4-
said Sheriff, if and when the subject premises are sold by 
him, out of the proceeds of such sale shall retain first his 
costs, disbursements and commission, and then pay to the 
Sharps, or to their attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs 
of this action, then said sums for the Sharps' attorneys' 
fees, and the amount owing to the Sharps for principal, in-
terest, costs and expenses of sale and maintenance, taxes, 
assessments and/or insurance premiums, together with accrued 
interest thereon, or so much of said sums as said proceeds 
will pay, and that the surplus, if any, shall be accounted for 
and paid over to the Clerk of this Court subject to this 
Court's further order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all per-
sons having an interest in the subject premises shall have the 
right, upon producing satisfactory proof of interest, to re-
deem the same within the time provided by law for such redemp-
tion; that from and after the expiration of the period of re-
demption as provided by law, that the plaintiffs above named, 
and each of them, and all persons claiming by, through or un-
der them, or any of them, shall be forever barred and fore-
closed of all right, title, interest and estate in and to the 
subject premises, and that from and after the delivery of the 
Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises that the grantees named 
therein be given possession thereof. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that if a 
deficiency results after due and proper application of the 
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proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are hereby awarded 
a personal judgment against Saunders, Felton, Norton and 
Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, jointly and sev-
erally, for the full amount of such deficiency. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Sharps shall have the right, at their request, to one connec-
tion to both plaintiffs' culinary water and sewer systems on 
White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connection fee of $2,000 
each. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a non-
exclusive appurtenant easement shall run with the land, as a 
covenant running with the land or as an equitable servitude, 
as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and benefit of 
the unplatted acreage described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
and incorporated herein by reference and the owners and pur-
chasers thereof (including the Sharps) and their invitees, 
guests, heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and 
for access to and the right to use as a means for ingress and 
egress for vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and 
across the private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the re-
corded final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I, recorded with 
the Summit County Recorder; and a non-exclusive appurtenant 
easement to run with the land, as a covenant running with the 
land or as an equitable servitude, as the case may be, in 
favor of and for the use and benefit of White Pine Ranches 
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Phase I and the owners and purchasers thereof (including the 
Sharps) and their heirs and successors in interest for water 
lines, water tank and water systems over, under and across the 
subject premises near the southwest corner of the unplatted 
acreage as also shown on the final recorded plat of White Pine 
Ranches Phase I. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
final plat and Declaration of Protective Covenants recorded 
for White Pine Ranches Phase I with the Summit County Record-
er's Office and the non-exclusive easements set forth above 
shall remain in full force and effect, and not be affected by 
the foreclosure ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's 
Sale, or a subsequent redemption of the subject premises, 
other than a complete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs 
herein coupled with plaintiffs' declaration for the ex-
tinguishment of the non-exclusive easement in favor of the 
unplatted acreage. 
DATED this -ZL day of <§tjffafa]fifr , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Hort. p. Dennis Frederick 
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Spinning a t * P^int South 89 degrees 43 f36" West along the 
H o n i l i n e of Lot 8, 173.42 f e e t fron the comer of Lata l 
and 3 , 4 brass cap s e t by the U.S. General Land Office, sa id 
b r a s s cap a lso being South 00 degrees 19 • 4 6" West along 
s e c t i o n l i n e 133 6.14 fee t from the Northeast-comer of 
S e c t i o n 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt LaXe Base 
and Meridian; and running thence South 39 degrees 43 ,36w 
West a long the North l i n e of Lot 7 and 3 2943.98 f ee t t o the 
Northwest ccrr.tr erf Lot 7; thence South 00 degrees 12*23" 
ZASZ a long tha Wast l ina of Lot 7, 1312.34 feet to the * 
Southwest- comer of Lot 7; thtnea North 89 degraas 47Ml" 
East a long the South l i n e of Lot 7, 332.67 feet ; thence 
North 61 degrees 00'00* East 1956.90 f e e t ; thence North 47 
d e g r e e s ll'lS" l a s : 462.75 f i a t ; thence North- 42 degrees 
44 UO" l a s t 35.63 £tet to tht point of beginning. 
LZSS ami excepting White Pine Ranches, Phase I, a Planned residential 
Development, according to the official plat thereof on f i le axxl cf 
record in the Sennit County Recorder's Office, State of Utah. 
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WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharp 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* 
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LEON H. SAUNDERS, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SHARP, et al., 
Defendants. 
JOHN C. SHARP, et al., 
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT FELTON, et al., 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO SET 
LIABILITY ON BOND 
Civil No. C87-1621 
(Judge J. Dennis Frederick) 
The Motion of defendants John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. 
Sharp (hereinafter the "Sharps") came on regularly for hearing 
before this Court on September 16, 1988. Plaintiffs White Pine 
Ranches, White Pine Enterprises, Leon H. Saunders, Robert 
Felton, and Saunders Land Investment Corporation (hereinafter 
collectively "White Pine") appeared through their counsel, 
APPENDIX D 
P, /.?<pj 
Robert M. Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gay lord. The 
Sharps appeared through their counsel, Donald J. Winder, Kathy 
A. F. Davis and Tamara K. Prince, Tracy Collins Bank was repre-
sented by its counsel,. Douglas J. Parry. No other parties in 
this action appeared either in person or through their counsel. 
The Court, having reviewed memoranda presented by counsel, 
having received and reviewed exhibits, having heard the argu-
ments of counsel, and for good cause appearing, hereby makes and 
enters the following in support of its Judgment entered against 
plaintiffs f sureties: 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The 7.0414 acres of Lot 6, White Pine Ranches Phase I, 
according to the final recorded plat filed in the Summit County 
Recorder's Office, State of Utah, has a present fair market val-
ue per acre of $25,000.00, for a total present fair market value 
of $176,035.00 (Ex. 97). 
2. The unplatted acreage described on Exhibit "AM to the 
Judgment entered herein, with one sewer and water connection 
available, contains 27.6205 acres and has a present fair market 
value of $20,000.00 per acre, for a total present fair market 
value of $552,410.00 (R. 494 and Ex. 97). 
3. Therefore, the present fair market value of the prop-
erties upon which the Sharps may foreclose pursuant to the Judg-
ment is $728,445o00. 
4. Under the Judgment, this Court found various of the 
White Pine plaintiffs jointly and severally indebted to the 
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Sharps in the total amount of $759,415.63, excluding interest at 
the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from the date of expend-
iture by the Sharps of trustee fees, Court costs, and attorneys1 
fees, and until paid by plaintiffs, and excluding interest and 
penalties assessed on delinquent property taxes from November 
30, 1984, through November 30, 1987, and excluding property tax-
es accruing but unpaid for 1988. 
5. Accordingly, the Sharps are under secured by the amount 
of $30,970.63, representing the difference between the Judgment 
($759,415.63) and the present fair market value of these prop-
erties ($728,445.00). 
6. As a condition of the issuance of the Temporary Re-
straining Order herein, White Pine posted a bond in the amount 
of $2,400.00 with the Summit County Clerk in September, 1986, 
and subsequently, pursuant to this Court's Order, additional 
security was posted by Tracy Collins Bank in the amount of 
$50,000.00, which was filed January 11, 1988. 
7. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued in this matter 
by the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4, 1986. 
8. Interest on the principal due under the Trust Deed Not€ 
for the period July 1, 1986, to June 30, 1987, equalled 
$66,913.08, and interest for the period July 1, 1987 tc 
March 22, 1988, equalled $48,764.04 (Ex. 122). 
9. Delinquent property taxes due just for the year 198" 
amounted to $2,144.15 for Lot 6 and $2,630.85 for the unplattec 
acreage (Stipulation of counsel, R. 707-708). 
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10. Pursuant to the Second Supplement to Affidavit in Sup-
port of Request for Attorney's Fees, attorneys for the Sharps 
were able to identify that at least four percent (4%) of their 
total fees related to defense of White Pine's injunction. Four 
percent (4%) of $144,088.75 is equal to $5,763.55, excluding 
legal services from and after January, 1988, through the trial 
and post-trial motions herei-n (Supplement to Affidavit of 
Donald J. Winder dated September 9, 1988). 
Having made the above supplemental findings of fact, the 
Court herewith makes and enters the following in support of its 
Judgment entered against plaintiffs' sureties: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has previously ordered, adjudged and decreed 
that the Temporary Restraining Order entered in this matter by 
the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4, 1986, was wrong-
fully issued and it is hereby lifted and dissolved. 
2. The Sharps, as the parties enjoined, are entitled to 
recover their costs and damages, including attorney's fees, in-
curred as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction. 
3. Having determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to 
tz ? the injunction, it is not necessary for this Court to inquire Jo | 
C| | into the good faith or bad faith of plaintiffs in obtaining the 
jj8 JZ I injunction. 
J; 8 s ^ 4. The amount of interest alone which as accumulated since 
s8jslM2f! September, 1986, when the injunction was first issued, far ex-
-4-
Si I 
••at 3 
ceeds the amount of both plaintiffs' cash bond and the security 
posted by Tracy Collins Bank. 
DATED this day of , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
HON. J. DENNIS FREDERICK, Judge 
-5-
TabE 
VALUE OF PROPERTY 
A. Value Trial Testimony (R.494) $20,000 acre with one sewer 
and water connection. 
i. Lot 6 (appraisal $25,000/acre x 
7.0414 acres'1) $176,035.00 
ii. Unplatted ($20,000/acre x 27.6205 acres) 552,410.00 
TOTAL: $728,445.00 
B. Debt 
i. Principal <371,739.35> 
ii. Interest 
a. Through 3/22/88 <171,033.54> 
b. 3/23/88 - 9/16/88 (per diem 
$183.32, 178 days) < 32,630.96> 
iii. Late Fees < 14,869.57> 
iv. Taxes 
a. Lot 6 < 10,932.78> 
b. Unplatted < 9,435.84> 
v. Attorney's Fees (through 8/31/88 
without interest) <144,469.75> 
vi. Trustee's Fees < 1,803.80> 
vii. Costs < 2,881.04> 
TOTAL: <$759,796 . 63> 
Testimony at Bond Hearing $17,500/acre. Transcript of Pia 
Testimony p. 35; Trial testimony $17,500/acre low end R.493 
Acreage figures from appraisal (Ex. 97) 
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